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"[T]he First An1endment cannot pern1it anyone who cries 'artist' to have carte 
blanche when it con1cs to nan1ing and advertising his or her works, art though it 
may be." 
--- Judge H olschuh1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Many notorious gangsters of the twentieth century are glorified through books, parades, 
television, and film. 2 The lives of these bandits developed a gangster genre that has flourished 
throughout the years. 3 This all makes for good business; however, it becon1es proble1natic when 
a gangster's name is federally registered as a traden1ark. 4 In today's 1narket, we have 
sophisticated criminals like Martha Stewart, and allegedly heinous crin1inals like O.J. Simpson, 
who are in the public eye, and have interacted with traden1ark law in one facet or another. 5 Such 
interesting events raise the question of whether a cri1ninal's name should be registered by the 
United States Patent and Traden1ark Office ("USPTO"), the an1ount of protection a criminal's 
mark should receive; specifically, when cmnpanies use the mark in tnedia containing product 
placement or inter-active purchasing options. 
1 See Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 447 (6th Cir. 2003) (discussing use of an artists ' name within the 
permissible scope of the First Amendment) . 
2 See Gangster Films Take Revenge on our Behalf, MSNBC.COM (June 28, 2009, 8:31 AM), 
http:/ /today. msnbc .msn. com/id/3 15 73 5 08/ns/toda y-entertainment/t/ gangster-film s-take-revenge-our-
behalf/#.TrHGHvQUqso ("Images of darkly ambitious men in snazzy suits performing antisocial acts have been 
popular for almost as long as it has been possible to capture them on film, through good times and bad."); Southern 
Arizona Transportation Museum, Dillinger Days Commercial, YouTuBE (June 27, 2009), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2x76rqHyOd8&feature=player_embedded (local Southern Arizona "Dillinger 
Days" Commercial). 
3 See People & Events: The Era of Gangster Films, 1930-1935, Pss 
http://www.pbs .org/wgbh/amex/dillinger/peopleevents/e_hollywood.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2012, 6:40PM) 
(discussing gangster genre in film). 
4 See Dillinger, LLC. v. Electronic Arts, Inc., No. 1 :09-cv-1236-JMS-DKL, 2011 U.S . Dist. LEXIS 64006, at *2 
(S.D. Ind. June 16, 2011) (holding that EA was entitled to summary judgment on its First Amendment defense 
because Dillinger, LLC did not raise any issue of fact, regarding Dillinger's relevance to the content of the 
Godfather video games); ANNE GILSON LALONDE, Use of Dillinger for Virtual Weapons in Video Games Protected 
by First Amendment, LExrsNEXIS, July 7, 2011, available at 2011 Emerging Issues 5755 (discussing the background 
and procedural history of Dillinger v. EA). 
5 See, The Verdict on Martha, CNNMONEY, http :l/money.cnn.com/2004/03/05/news/companies/martha _ verdicl/ 
(last updated March 10, 2004: 1:51 P.M); Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F3d 1092 (D .C. Cir. 1999) (An individual filed an 
opposition against Orcnthal James Simpson's registration of trademarks for his name and nickname, including "O.J. 
Simpson," "O.J.," and "The Juice."). 
2 
Generally, the use of a trademark in non-commercial n1edia raises a First Amendment 
tssue. A perfect example of this issue is raised in Dillingej'" v. EA. 6 John Dillinger ("J.D."), an 
infamous bank robber during the 1930's,7 has descendants who frequently engage in trade1nark 
infringetnent litigation.8 Recently, Dillinger, LLC,9 a company forn1ed by J.D.'s descendants, 
sued Electronic Arts, Inc. 10 ("EA") for trademark infringement because EA used the name 
Dillinger in its video games. 11 EA raised a First Amendment defense and shortly thereafter, the 
case was dismissed. 12 
Currently, the Rogers v. Grimaldi13 test (also known as the artistic relevance test) is the 
test predominantly used by courts to decide whether there is a valid First An1endment defense in 
a trademark infringement claim; however, the alternative avenues test and likelihood of 
confusion test are also used. 14 Being the predominant test does not mean that the artistic 
relevance test provides an equitable balance between First An1endment rights and trademark 
rights. An analysis of existing case law indicates that courts inconsistently apply the Rogers v. 
6 See Dillinger, 2011 U .S . Dist. LEXIS 64006, at *2 . 
7 See generally BRYAN BURROUGH , PUBLIC ENEMIES xii (The Penguin Press) (2004) (chronicling lives of famous 
criminals and their exploits) . 
8 See Millions at Stake as EA Sues Bank Robber's Relative Over Godfather Game Machine Guns, 
GAMEPOLITICS.COM, http ://gamepolitics .com/2009/09/02/millions-stake-ea-sues-bank-robber039s-relative-over-
godfather-game-machine-guns (Sept. 2, 2009) (discussing EA's filing in the Northern District Court of California 
seeking a declaratory judgment that would allow it to use the mark Dillinger in its video games). 
9 See Dillinger, 2011 U .S . Dist. LEX IS 64006, at *4 (S .D. Ind . June 16, 2011) ("Plaintiff claims to own the publicity 
rights of the 'late depression-era bandit' John Dillinger, as well as the trademark rights in the words 'John 
Dillinger."') . 
10 EA is a global interactive entertainment software company that was developed in 1982. The company develops , 
publishes, and distributes interactive software for video game systems among other devices. See EA.COM, 
http://aboutus.ea.com/home.action. 
11 See Dillinger, LLC. v. Electronic Arts, Inc., No . 1 :09-cv-1236-JMS-DKL, 2011 U .S. Dist. LEXIS 64006, at *2 
(S.D. Ind. June 16, 2011). 
12 See id. 
13 See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2nd Cir.l989) (holding that the Lanham Act should apply to movie 
titles only where the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the public interest in free expression, 
unless the title has no artistic relevance, or if the title does have some artistic relevance , the title does not explicitly 
mislead the public.) 
14 See Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. v. Capece, 141 f. 3d 188, 207(5 th Cir. 1998); Mutual ofOmaha, Ins . Co . v. 
Novak, 836 F.2d 397, (8th Cir. 1987); LALONDE, supra note 4. 
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Grimaldi test, probably because it is unclear regarding its test; and, courts still apply other tests. 15 
In this note, Part II will provide biographical information on the notorious bandit J.D. and 
discuss Dillinger v. EA. 16 Part III will provide a general background on trademark law topics 
relevant to Dillinger v. EA, 17 including a survey of federal court decisions involving the First 
Amendn1ent defense in traden1ark infringement clai1ns, 18 and a proposed fourth test that can 
clarify the confusion in existing case law. 19 Lastly, Part IV of this Note concludes by declaring 
the need for consistency mnong the federal courts, which need to provide a test that combines all 
three tests in order to preserve First Amendment protections, trade1nark protections, and overall 
legal consistency. 20 
II. BACKGROUND 
a. John Dillinger's biographical information 
In Dillinger v. EA, the trademark at issue was the name of the infamous J.D. The court 
described J.D. as a "legendary gentleman-bandit," but, according to the FBI, J.D. was a 
15 Compare, Rogers, 875 F .2d at 1005 ("To properly analyze this issue, the Court must therefore consider a two-part 
test: First, the Court must determine whether the use of the mark has any artistic relevace to the underlying work 
whatsoever; second, if the use of the trademark has some relevance, the Court must detem1ine whether it explicitly 
misleads the public as to the source or content ofthe work"), with Twin Peaks Prod . Inc. v Publ'n Int'l, Ltd. , 996 
F.2d 1366, 1379-1380 (holding that literary titles do not violate the Lanham Act unless the title has no artistic 
relevance, however, if the title does have artistic relevance the title must explicitly mislead the public according to 
the Polaroid factors.), No Fear, Inc. v. Imagine Films, Inc., 930 F .Supp. 1381, 1383-1384 (C.D. Cali. 1995) 
(analyzing Rogers' first prong by determining artistic relevance and the second prong by analyzing the likelihood of 
confusion factors, and then weighing Plaintiff's showing of likelihood of confusion against defendants' First 
Amendment concerns), and Cardtoons v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d at 959 (stating that the "no 
adequate alternative avenues" test does not sufficiently accommodate the public's interest in free expression" and 
that "[P]roof of trademark infringement under the Lanham Act requires proof of a likelihood of confusion"), White 
v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399-1400 (9th Cir. 1992) ("To prevail on her Lanham Act claim, 
White is required to show that in running the robot ad, Samsung and Deutsch created a likelihood of confusion"), 
and Mutual of Omaha, Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d at 397 ("Mutual trademarks are a fonn of property, and Mutual's 
rights therein need not "yield to the exercise of First Amendment rights under circumstances where adequate 
altemative avenues of communication exist.") (citations omitted). 
16 See infra pp. 4. 
17 See infra pp. 10. 
18 See infra pp. 15. 
19 See infra pp. 21 . 
20 See infra pp. 26. 
4 
------------------- ----
"notorious and vicious thief," and a "lurid desperado" who evoked the gangster era. 21 J.D. was 
born on June 22, 1903, in Indianapolis, Indiana. 22 He was born to John Dillinger, Sr. and Mary 
Ellen Lancaster, and was the youngest of three children. 23 Unfortunately, J.D .' s n1other, Mary 
Lancaster, died of a stroke when he was barely four years old. 24 Thereafter, his father 1noved the 
family to Mooresville, Indiana so that J.D. could stay out of trouble. 25 
At the age of sixteen, J.D. dropped out of school, rebelling against his father's advice, and 
continued to work at his job eighteen miles away from their new hmne?6 J.D. comtnitted his 
first recorded crime, car theft, in Mooresville, Indiana. 27 During this tin1e, his wild behavior 
intensified when he began routinely drinking, fighting, and visiting prostitutes .28 In 1923, for 
instance, J.D. stole a car to impress a girl on a date, and luckily escaped a police chase.29 In 
1924, J.D. tried robbing a 65-year-old Mooresville, Indiana grocer;30 he was caught, convicted, 
and spent the next nine years in prison. 31 Prison did nothing to rehabilitate J.D. Indeed, while 
21 See Dillinger, LLC. v Electronic Arts, Inc. , No. 1 :09-cv-1236-JMS-DKL, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64006, at *4 
(S.D. Ind. June 16, 2011) . 
22 See DARY MATERA, JOHN DILLINGER: THE LIFE AND DEATH OF AMERICA'S FIRST CELEBRITY CRIMINAL, CAROLL 
& GRAF PUBLISHERS 10-11(2004). 
23 See id. at 10-12. Dillinger's subsequent marriage gave J.D. more siblings. 
24 See id. 
25 See id. at II. 
26 See MATERA, supra note 22, at 14. 
27 See MATERA, supra note 22, at 29. 
28 See MATERA, supra note 22, at 29. 
29 See MATERA, supra note 22, at 29. 
30 Allan May & Marilyn Bardsley, John Dillinger, TRUTV.COM, 
http ://www.trutv.com/library/crime/gangsters _ outlaws/outlaws/dillinger/2.html (last visited Nov. 25, 20 12) . J.D. 
believed that the grocer would be carrying the receipts, but he was not and the grocer fought back and accidentally 
discharged the gun. J.D. ran away thinking that he killed the grocer and when he reached the location where the 
fetaway car was suppose to be he found no one there . 
1 See MATERA, supra note 22, at 27-32 . Dillinger actually had a long prison history . First, he went to a juvenile 
facility, Pendleton, which was a "bleak incarceration center." See id. Pendelton was a "tan-colored stone buildings 
with red tile roofs, thirty-foot concrete walls, and gun towers at each of its four corners." ld. Soon enough, 
Dillinger requested to move to an adult facility after having his parole denied. His request was later granted and J.D. 
was transferred to the Indiana State Penitentiary. ld. 
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incarcerated, he in1proved his bank robbing tactics, 32 which allowed him to rob banks with 
• . .c: 1 33 1mpun1ty 10r so ong. 
Robbing banks was the norm for gangsters from the Great Depression Era. 34 For instance, in 
1933, J.D. robbed numerous banks throughout the Midwest and broke out of jail twice. 35 Like in 
today's econon1y, many citizens blamed the banks and goven1ment for the economic tun11oil 
they were suffering.36 As a result, citizens who should have decried obvious crin1inal behavior 
frequently saw J.D. and other crin1inals as mythical "Robin Hood" vigilantes who were actually 
defeating evil government forces. 37 
One of the greatest aids to J.D.'s crime spree was his gun of choice. During J.D.'s rise to 
power, John T. Thon1pson developed the Thompson submachine gun ("T01nmy Gun') for 
n1ilitary use. 38 At first, the machine gun was used as a crime-fighting tool; but, like n1any 
weapons used to fight cri1ne, the Tommy Gun ended up in the hands of crin1inals. The gun was 
"con1pact, easily hidden and light enough that its tremendous firepower could be unleashed 
swiftly from under a coat or fr01n the back of a speeding black sedan."39 J.D.'s strong 
association with Tommy Guns resulted from the large an1ounts seized from his hideouts.40 
32 See MATERA, supra note 22, at 32. During Dillinger's time at the Indiana State Penitentiary he had the 
opportunity to learn from "criminal mentors," who were thieves, burglars, bookmakers, safecrackers, and other 
organized crime specialists . 
33 John Dillinger, BIOGRAPHY. COM, http://www.biography.com/people/john-dillinger-9274804 (last visited Nov . 25 , 
2012). 
34 See PBS, supra note 3. 
35 See Star Files : John Dillinger, INDYSTAR.COM, 
http://www.indystar.com/article/99999999/NEWS06/80519042/StarFiles-John-Dillinger (last visited Nov. 10, 
20 12). 
36 See PBS, supra note 3 . 
37 See PBS, supra note 3 . 
38 See BURROUGH, supra note 7 . 
39 See BURROUGH, supra note 7. 
40 See See Dillinger, LLC. v Electronic Arts, Inc., No . 1 :09-cv-1236-JMS-DKL, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64006, at *4 
(S.D. Ind. June 16, 2011); Public Enemies Featurette, IMDB.COM, 
http://www.imdb .com/v ideo/imdb/vill563177211. 
6 
Figure 1: 1928 Tommy Gun Submachine Gun41 
J.D.'s criminal career can1e to an end when federal agents obtained a tip that J.D. would be at 
a theater with his friend, Anna Sage,42 a brothel owner.43 On July 22, 1934, J.D., who had 
become known as "Public Enen1y No. 1" was shot in the head and chest, and killed by federal 
agents after leaving a theatre in Chicago.44 Upon J.D.'s death, J. Edgar Hoover, FBI Chief 
expressed that he was delighted that his men succeeded in getting rid of Public Enemy No.l .45 
b. Dillinger v. EA 
Several years after his death, J.D.'s family created Dillinger LLC. 46 The owner of 
Dillinger, LLC is J.D.'s half-sister's grandson; and, he clain1s rights to the Dillinger name and 
likeness.47 
The dispute at the heart of the Dillinger v. EA case resulted from EA' s use of Dillinger in 
its Godfather and Godfather II video gatne series.48 The Godfather video game used "Dillinger 
Tommy Gun" to name one of its fifteen weapons and Godfather II used "Modern Dillinger" as 
41 This image displays the infamous "Tommy Gun" that Dillinger was heavily associated with. AR UN DEL 
MILITARIA, http ://www .deactivated-guns .co.uk/detai II 1928A 1-5 .htm. 
42 See People & Events: The Era a/Gangster Films, 1930-1935, PBS, 
http://www.pbs .org/wgbh/amex/dillinger/peopleevents/e_betrayal.html (last visited Nov . 26, 2012). The FBI 
promised Anna Sage that she would not be deported if she helped them catch J.D .. The FBI ultimately reneged on its 
promise and deported Sage to Romania . 
43 See Dillinger Slain in Chicago,· Shot Dead by Federal Men in Front of Movie Theatre, NYTIMES .COM (July 22, 
1934), 
http ://www.nytimes .com/learning/general/onthisdaylbig/0722 .html?scp=l &sq=john%20dillinger&st=cse#article; 
John Dillinger, BIOGRAPHY. COM, http://www. biography.com/people/john-dillinger-9274804 (last visited Jan . 29, 
2012, 2:30PM). 
44 See NYTIMES .COM, supra, note 43. 
45 See NYTIMES.COM, supra, note 43. 
46 See LALONDE, supra note 4 . 
47 See LALONDE, supra note 4 . 
48 See LALONDE, supra note 4 
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part of its downloadable "Level 4 Weapons Bundle."49 EA claimed that Dillinger LLC had 
previously threatened legal action if the publisher did not agree to pay millions of dollars for 
using Dillinger in its Godfather game. 5° 
Figure 2: Godfather II image of the Modern Dillinger51 
Figure 3: Godfather video game image of the Dillinger gun52 
The decision in Dillinger v. EA, was the court's response to cross motions for summary 
judgment.53 Dillinger, LLC's Complaint initially contained six claims, but after a n1otion to 
disn1iss three claitns remained.54 The remaining claitns involved two tradetnark infringen1ent 
49 See Dillinger, LLC. v Electronic Arts, Inc., No. 1 :09-cv-1236-JMS-DKL, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64006 , at *7-8 
(S.D. Ind . June 16, 2011 ). 
50 See LALONDE, supra note 4 . 
51 TenkaQ6, Godfather 2: Level 4 Weapons, YouTUBE (April 29, 2009), 
http ://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NDS 1 D21e8j0. 
52 EA Victorious in Dillinger Lawsuit, VG24/7, http ://www.vg247 .com/2011/06/22/ea-victorious-in-dillinger-
lawsuit/ (last updated June 22, 2011) . 
53 See Dillinger, 2011 U .S. Dist. LEXTS 64006, at *2. 
54 Dillinger, LLC v E1ec. Arts Inc., 795 F Supp 2d 829, 831 (S.D . Ind. 2011). 
("Count I accuses EA of violating Indiana's right-of-publicity statute, Ind . Code§§ 32- 36-1-1 et seq. Count II says 
that EA has committed unjust enrichment. Counts III and V, which the parties treat together and so will the Court, 
8 
claitns, which the court and parties agreed to treat as one, and an unfair competition claim. 55 In a 
footnote, the court noted that the Seventh Circuit had not decided on the propriety of the artistic 
relevance test. The court applied the artistic relevance test because both parties agreed that it 
was applicable. The court stated: 
"To properly analyze this issue, the Court must therefore consider a two-part test: 
First, the Court must determine whether the use of the mark has any artistic 
relevance to the underlying work whatsoever; second, if the use of the tradetnark 
has smne relevance, the Court must detem1ine whether it explicitly misleads the 
public as to the source or content of the work."56 
First, the court analyzed whether artistic relevance existed and it decided that the 
Godfather video game series did have a tninutia amount of relevance, which met the low 
threshold required by the artistic relevance test. 57 The court noted that according to the artistic 
relevance test, it was not the court ' s job to detern1ine the strength of the relahonship between a 
trademark and a literary work because any connection whatsoever sa6sfies the test's low artistic 
relevance threshold. 58 
Second, the court determined whether the use in the gatne was explicitly misleading. 59 
There, the court defined explicitly misleading as requiring defendant's work to make some 
affirmative statement ofplaintiff1s sponsorship or endorsen1ent, beyond the m.ere usc of plaintiffs 
nmne or other characteristic . 60 Regarding this second step, the court found that Plaintiff failed to 
show that EA explicitly 1nislead consun1ers; thus, EA was entitled to the First Amendment's 
accuse EA of trademark infringement. Count IV alleges unfair competition. Finally, Count VI raises a claim under 
Indiana's Crime Victim Act.") . 
55 See id. 
56 See Dillinger, .2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64006, at *4. 
57 See id. at *6. 
58 See Dillinger, LLC. v Electronic Arts, Inc., No. 1 :09-cv-1236-JMS-DKL, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64006, at *6 
(S.D . Ind. June 16, 2011). 
59 See id. 
60 See id. at *8. 
9 
. 61 h' h protectiOn . T IS meant t at according to the court, no issue of fact existed regarding 
Dillinger's relevance to the Godfather series' content and EA' s use of the n1ark did not explicitly 
mislead consumers. 62 
Unfortunately, Dillinger LLC failed in its defense because it did not argue for a test that 
would have resulted in a favorable outcome. Dillinger LLC conceded to using the artistic 
relevance test even though it contains an extraordinary low threshold to satisfy its artistic 
relevance requirement. Further, the court noted that there was cmntnercial undertones in EA 's 
Godfather II video game because "The Moden1 Dillinger" was a part of the "Level 4 Weapons 
Bundle" that required a monetary transaction. If Dillinger LLC would have used either the 
likelihood of confusion test or the alternative avenues test it would have had a better chance at 
prevailing. 
Ill. ANALYSIS 
a. Trademark law as it pertains to Dillinger v. EA 
Traden1arks generally serve the purpose of identifying a product as cmn1ng fron1 the 
same source.63 Federal trademark law is codified in the Lanhatn Act. 64 The Lanham Act was 
enacted in 1946 with the purpose of providing incentive to register trademarks, prevent unfair 
competition, fraud, and needless deception. 65 
Trademarks generally provide several consumer benefits, including protecting a business' 
good will, assuring product quality, and strengthening consumer identification regarding a 
61 See id. 
62 See id. 
63 See 15 U .S.C.A § 1127 (West 2006), SlEGRUN D. KANE, WHAT lS A TRADEMARK?, TRADEMARK L. : PRAC . GUIDE 
§1:1.1 (2011) . 
64 15 U.S.C.A § 1127 ("The term 'trademark' includes any word, name, symbol, or device or any 
combination thereof-(1) used by a person, or (2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in 
commerce and applies toregister on the principal register established by this chapter[.]") . 
65 SeeS. Rep . No. 1399, 1974 U.S.C .C.A.N. 7113 , 7114; 74 Am. Jur. 2d Trademarks and Tradenames § 6. 
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product's origin.66 While a traden1ark can consist of various words and syn1bols, it does not 
necessarily have to be a brand name. 67 For instance, the overwhelming majority of individuals 
see the Coca-Cola logo and its curvy bottle shape and probably identify the Coca-Cola brand, 
which of course is a Coca-Cola trademark. 68 
Notably, the Lanhatn Act provides that owners of similar and confusing marks can be 
held liable for trademark infringement. 69 Confusion includes uncertainty between products, and 
extends to confusion regarding endorsements, sponsorships, or any connection with the 
trademark owner. 7° Confusion is further defined to include any uncertainty before and after 
purchase. 71 
Generally, the Lanhatn Act is enforced by applying the likelihood of conjitsion test in 
trademark infringements. 72 The federal courts all apply a different version of a multi-factor test 
to detennine whether a likelihood of confusion exists; however, the factors are generally the 
san1e.73 This Note will refer to the eight likelihood of confusion factors am1ounced in AMP Inc. 
66 See Scandia Down Corp v. Euroquilty, Inc. 772 F.2d 1423, 1429 (7th Cir. 1985) ("[T]he lower the costs of search 
the more competitive the market. A trademark also may induce the supplier of goods to make higher quality 
products and to adhere to a consistent level of quality.") 
67 Kane, supra note 63 ("While a brand name is always a trademark, a trademark is not always a brand name. 
Trademarks can consist of a variety of words and symbols[.]"). 
68 Coca-Cola Co. v Snow Crest Beverages, 64 F. Supp. 980, 985 (D. Mass. 1946) 
09 See 15 U.S .C. ~ 1114 (highli ghting " likel.ihood of confusion"); Shakey's Inc. v. Covalt, 704 F.2d 426,431 (9th 
Cir. 1983), SIEGRUN D. KANE, RELATION BETWEEN TRADEMARKS AND OTHER INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, 
TRADEMARK L.: PRAC. GUIDE§ 1:1.5 (2011) (stating that unfair acts include trade name infringement where a 
business ' name is likely to cause confusion with an established business name). 
70 See Shakey 's, 704 F.2d at 431, SIEGRUN D. KANE, CONSUMER PROTECTION : TI-lE LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION 
STANDARD, TRADEMARKL.: PRAC. GUIDE §1 :3 (2011) . 
71 See KANE, supra note 70. 
72 See 15 USCA § 1051 [West]; Polaroid Corp v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961) (holding 
that plaintiffs delay in bringing an infringement suit against defendant a similar mark in a different business barred 
plaintiff from bringing a claim against defendant). 
73 Compare, AMF Inc . v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 , 348 (9th Cir. 1979) ("In determining whether confusion 
between related goods is likely, the following factors are relevant: (1) the strength of the mark; (2) proximity of the 
goods; (3) similarity of the marks ; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) marketing channels used; (6) type of goods 
and the degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser; (7) defendant's intent in selecting the mark; and (8) 
likelihood of expansion of the product lines."), with Polaroid, 287 F.2d at 495 ("(i) the strength of the mark, (ii) the 
degree of similarity between the two marks, (iii) the proximity of the products; (iv) the likelihood that the prior 
owner will bridge the gap, (v) actual confusion, (vi) the reciprocal of defendant's good faith in adopting its own 
11 
v. Sleekcraft Boats.74 Under that test, courts examine the following factors to detern1ine whether 
a likelihood of confusion exists: 
(1) the strength of the n1ark; (2) proximity of the goods; (3) sin1ilarity of the 
marks; ( 4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) tnarketing channels used; (6) type of 
goods and the degree of care likely to be excercised by the purchaser; (7) 
defendant's intent in selecting the mark; and (8) likelihood of expansion of the 
d 1. 75 pro uct 1nes. 
i. Strength of a mark 
Moreover, a traden1ark's strength can fall into one of four categories. 76 The four categories 
of strength are: (1) arbitrary and fanciful, 77 (2) suggestive, 78 (3) descriptive, 79 and ( 4) generic. 80 
Courts have defined the phrase "arbitrary and fanciful" as words that have no connection 
with the product or service; however, courts provide the greatest protection to such marks. 81 For 
example, KODAK is an arbitrary and fanciful mark because the word "Kodak" has nothing to do 
with film. 82 Indeed, thinking of the word Kodak immediately produces the in1age of that 
particular film company, and nothing else.83 
Next, courts define "suggestive" tnarks as those that portray son1ething about a particular 
mark, (vii) the quality of defendant's product, and (viii) the sophistication of the buyers"). 
74 See Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 348. 
75 See id. 
76 See SIEGRUN D. KANE, FACTORS TO CONSIDER IN DETERMINING LIKELY CONFUSION, Trademark L. : Prac. Guide 
§8:1.3 (2011). 
77 See Kookai, S.A. v. Shabo, 950 F.Supp 605, 607 (S .D. NY 1997) ("The Second Circuit has repeatedly held that an 
arbitrary or fanciful mark, such as plaintiffs mark, which does not suggest the nature of plaintiffs business , is the 
strongest of all marks."). 
78 See Stix Products, Inc . v. United Merchants & Mfrs ., Inc., 295 F.Supp. 479, 488 (S .D. NY 1968) ("A term is 
suggestive if it requires imagination, thought and perception to reach a conclusion as to the nature of goods.). 
79 See id. ("A term is descriptive if it forthwith conveys an immediate idea of the ingredients, qualities or 
characteristics of the goods ."). 
80 See Enrique Bernat F ., S .A . v. Guadalajara, Inc., 210 F.3d 439,445 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding "chupa" was a geneic 
tenn in Spanish for lollipop so the district comi's finding of a likelihood of confusion against defendant's "chupa 
gurts" was in eiTor). 
81 See Eastman Kodak Co v. Photaz Imports Ltd., Inc., 853 F.Supp. 667,672 (W.D.N.Y. 1993); KANE, supra note 
76. 
82 See id. 
83 See id. 
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product or serv1ce, like CITIBANK. 84 The word CIT! merely suggests a "city" and BANK 
suggests the service offered; thus, the merger of the words merely suggests a local city's bank. 85 
Third, "descriptive" marks are relegated to those that immediately describe the product or 
service, like "frosted flakes. " 86 
Fourth, "generic" is the riskiest category because it provides no protection. Generic marks 
are defined as the comn1on name for the product or service.87 For example, the trademark 
"Google" tnay smneday become generic because it has grown to tnean "perfom1 an internet 
search;" in other words, the con1pany nan1e no longer serves only as the name of the company, 
but as a everyday term. 
One of the critical issues in trademark law is traden1ark preservation. 88 Although one may 
own a registered traden1ark, if the holder does not take the proper precautions to protect the 
traden1ark, the strength of the 1nark and the protection given to it can din1inish drastically .89 The 
mark's use must relate to an existing business.90 Therefore, to protect a trademark the owner 
should be vigilant to carefully search and select a mark that does not have possible conflicts. 
The owner must use the mark publicly, properly, and continuously with the associated goods or 
services. 91 Moreover, the mark holder should register the mark with the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office, and be wary of infringements by third parties. 92 
ii. Surnatnes as trademarks 
84 See Citibank, N.A. v. Citibanc Group, Inc., 724 F .2d 1540, 1545 (11th Cir. 1984) ("[N]o other firm , bank or 
otherwise, was using 'Citibank' as a trade name, trademark, or service mark."). 
85 See id. 
86 See id. 
87 See Enrique Bernat F., S.A . v. Guadalajara, Inc., 210 F .3d 439, 445 (5th Cir. 2000) . 
88 See SIEGRUN D. KANE, ESTABLISHING PRIORITY, TRADEMARK L.: PRAC. GUIDE §5.1 (20 11). 
89 See id. 
90 See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U .S. 90, 97 (1918) (noting that "the right to a particular mark 
grows out of its use, not its mere adoption; its function is simply to designate the goods as the product of a particular 
trader and not to protect his good will against the sale of another's product as his; and it is not the subject of property 
except in connection with an existing business.") 
91 See id. 
92 See SIEGRUN D. KANE, INSTRUCTION, TRADEMARK L.: PRAC . GUIDE §.8 (2011) . 
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The Lanham Act provides protections based on free-speech concerns. For exmnple, it 
bars registering a generic or descriptive mark, surname or geographic tern1. 93 The Lanham Act 
provides these protections so that it can preserve the rights of others to use needed tenns and 
phrases.94 A surname may only be registered on the Lanhmn Act's Principal Register if the 
owner can show a secondary n1eaning. 95 Additionally, if the surnan1e belongs to a historical 
figure and that name is not currently used as a surname the summne will not be subject to the 
Lanham Act objection. 96 
iii. Scandalous and ilnmoral marks are barred 
More to the point, the Lanham Act bars registration of traden1arks that are immoral or 
scandalous. 97 The registration of a 1nark that is immoral or scandalous can be barred from 
registration but these objections must occur during the registration process.98 The decisions on 
whether a mark is immoral or scandalous are very inconsistent and are based on what may seem 
vulgar. 99 The American population determines the standard of vulgar, therefore, old disputes do 
d . d" 100 not etennme current 1sputes. 
iv. Fair use 
Defendants accused of trademark infringement have several important defenses at their 
93 See 15 USCA § 1052 [West 2006] ("Consists of or comprises a name, portrait, or signature identifying a particular 
living individual except by his written consent, or the name, signature, or portrait of a deceased President of the 
United States during the life of his widow, if any, except by the written consent of the widow." 
94 See id. 
95 LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, UNREGISTRABLE MARKS-SURNAMES, 4A CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMP, § 
26:37 (4th Ed . 2012) . 
96 See id. 
97 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1052(a)[West 2006]. 
98 See TRAVIS BURCHART, Dirty, Naughty, and Four-Letter Words : Where Trademarks End and Scandalous Matter 
Begins, LEXISNEXIS.COM (May 24, 2011, 8:21 AM) available at http ://www.lexisnexis.com/community/copyright-
trademarklaw/blogs/copyrightandtrademarklawcommunity.com. Dillinger should have most likely been considered 
a slanderous or immoral mark because of Dillinger's life of crime. 
99 LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, UNREGISTRABLE MARKS-IMMORAL OR SCANDALOUS MARKS, 4A CALLMANN 
ON UNFAIR COMP , § 26: 15(4th Ed . 2012). 
100 See id. 
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disposal. 101 The defense at issue in Dillinger v. EA is fair use, which derives fron1 the First 
Amendment. 102 The doctrine of fair use is supported by policies that favor the public's interest 
in free speech. 103 The Lanham defines fair use as: 
[U]se of the name, tenn or device charged to be an infringement as a use, 
otherwise than as a tnark, of the party's individual name in his own business, or of 
the individual nan1e of anyone in privity with such party, or of a term or device 
which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe the 
goods or services of such party, or their geographic origin. 104 
Fair use may be one of the more problematic defenses as it relates to intellectual property 
because the court 1nust weigh First Amendn1ent rights of free speech against the right of a 
trademark owner's exclusive use of a mark. 105 Fair use in the trademark context, requires that 
the n1ark not be used as a trademark. This distinction is not always clear. 
b. Federal court decisions in First Amendment and trademark infringetnent 
cases 
Generally, trademark law uses the likelihood of confusion test to detennine whether a 
traden1ark infringement exists.' 06 However, when there is a trademark infringe1nent clain1 and a 
defendant raises a fair use defense, courts apply different tests. 1 07 Although, common sense 
101 See SIEGRUN D. KANE, AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES, TRADEMARK L. : PRAC. GUIDE§ 12:2 (2011). (Listing the 
affirmative defenses of (i) laches and acquiescence, (ii) estoppel, (iii) abandonment, (iv) fair use, (v) genericness, 
(vi) fraud in the procurement and maintenance of trademark registrations, (vii) unclean hands, (viii) trademark 
misue, and (ix) violation of antitrust laws .) 
102See Dillinger, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXlS 64006, at *2, SIEGRUN D. KANE, FAIR USE, TRADEMARK L.: PRAC. GUIDE 
§12:2.4(2011). 
103 See id. 
104 See 15 U.S.C .A. § 1115 (West 2006). 
105 See THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, DESCRIPTIVE USE (FAIR USE), RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 28 (20 12). 
106 See 15 USCA § 1051 [West]. 
107 Compare, Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1005 ("To properly analyze this issue, the Court must therefore consider a two-
part test: First, the Court must determine whether the use of the mark has any artistic relevace to the underlying 
work whatsoever; second, if the use of the trademark has some relevance, the Court must determine whether it 
explicitly misleads the public as to the source or content of the work"), with Twin Peaks Prod. Inc. v Pub! 'n Int' I, 
Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1379-1380 (holding that literary titles do not violate the Lanham Act unless the title has no 
artistic relevance, however, if the title does have artistic relevance the title must explicitly mislead the public 
according to the Polaroid factors .), No Fear, Inc. v. Imagine Films, Inc., 930 F.Supp. 1381, 1383-1384 (C.D. Cali. 
1995) (analyzing Rogers' first prong by determining artistic relevance and the second prong by analyzing the 
likelihood of confusion factors, and then weighing Plaintiffs showing of likelihood of confusion against defendants' 
15 
would tell us that the likelihood of confitsion test would be the predon1inant test because it comes 
directly from the Lanham Act, it is not. 108 Even worse, federal courts have inconsistently 
analyzed whether a First Amendment defense has any validity in trademark infringen1ent 
claims. 1 09 Additional discussion of this i1nportant issue follows in the next section. 
i. Artistic relevance test 
The Second Circuit decision, Rogers v. Grimaldi, provides the predominant test followed 
by several other courts, the artistic relevance test. 110 In Rogers v. Grimaldi, the court held that 
the Lanhmn Act does not prohibit the minimal use of a celebrities' nan1e, in the title of an artistic 
work, if such use does not specifically denote endorsen1ent. 111 In Rogers, Ginger Rogers sued 
defendants for distributing a motion picture named Ginger and Fred. 1 12 The film concerned the 
story of two fictional characters that i1nitated Fred Astaire and plaintiff, who later becan1e known 
as "Ginger and Fred."113 Among plaintiffs other clain1s, she alleged that the defendants violated 
the Lanham Act by creating a false i1npression that she was smnehow affiliated with the film. 1 14 
The court believed that the Lanham Act should apply to artistic works only when 
avoiding consumer confusion outweighed the public's interest in free expression. 115 The court 
further noted that if a title is not artistically relevant, its free expression interest was not justified 
First Amendment concerns), and Cardtoons v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d at 959 (stating that the 
"no adequate altemative avenues" test does not sufficiently accommodate the public's interest in free expression" 
and that "[P]roof of trademark infringement under the Lanham Act requires proof of a likelihood of confusion"), 
White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Tnc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399-1400 (9th Cir. 1992) ("To prevail on her Lanham Act 
claim, White is required to show that in running the robot ad, Samsung and Deutsch created a likelihood of 
confusion"), and Mutual of Omaha, Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d at 397 ("Mutual trademarks are a form of property, 
and Mutual's rights therein need not "yield to the exercise of First Amendment rights under circumstances where 
adequate alternative avenues of communication exist.") (citations omitted). 
108 See 15 USCA § 1051 [West]. 
109 See Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 447 (6111 Cir. 2003) . 
110 See LALONDE, supra note 3. 
111 See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1005 (2nd Cir.1989). 
112 See id. at 996-997. 
113 See id. 
114 See id. 
115 See id. 
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--- -------- -----
and was arguably rnisleading. 116 The two prong artistic relevance test requires two inquiries: (1) 
is the use of the title n1inimally artistically relevant; and (2) if the title is artistically relevant does 
it explicitly mislead. 117 However, the Rogers artistically relevant threshold is so low that almost 
anything qualifies as artistically relevant. 118 Effectively, the artistically relevant test protects 
every title with the slightest artistic relevance as long as it does not explicitly mislead. 119 For 
instance in this case, the court granted sun1n1ary judgment in favor of Grimaldi because it found 
that the title Ginger and Fred was artistically relevant to the film because the film's title did not 
explicitly indicate that Ginger Rogers endorsed it in any way. 120 
Following its sister circuit, the Sixth Circuit, in Parks v. LaFace Records, chose to use 
the artistic relevance test over using the alternative avenues test and the likelihood of confusion 
test. 121 In Parks v. LaFace Records, Rosa Parks sued OutKast for using her nan1e as the title of 
one of its songs. 122 Just like the arguments raised by EA in Dillinger v. EA, OutKast argued that 
Rosa Parks' Lanham Act claitn must fail because it did not use her name as a tradetnark, and the 
First An1endn1ent protected the title of the song. 123 The court, in tun1, stated that "the First 
An1endment cannot permit anyone who cries 'artist' to have carte blanche protection when it 
con1es to nan1ing and advertising his or her works .... " 124 There, the court adopted the Rogers 
test and remanded the case so that the jury could determine whether "Rosa Parks" had any 
artistic relevance to the song. 125 The case settled before there was a decision on ren1and, which 
11 6 See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2nd Cir.1989). 
117 See id. 
118 See id. 
11 9 See id. at 994. 
120 See id. at 1004. 
121 See Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437,450 (6111 Cir. 2011). 
122 Seeid. at441. 
123 See id. at 446-447 . 
124 See id. at447. 
125 See id. 
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left the legal con1n1unity wondering whether Outkast or Rosa Parks would have prevailed. 126 
In Matte!, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., the Ninth Circuit also adopted the artistically relevant 
test. Unlike, Parks, this case was not settled and provided in1portant insight into a court's 
application of the artistically relevant test. 127 In this case, the Danish band Aqua produced a 
song named "Barbie Girl." 128 The single was a hit and made it onto the Top 40 music charts 
during its release. 129 Mattei, the famous toy company known for creating the cultural icon, 
Barbie, sued MCA Records for producing this song. 130 The court granted stnnmary judgment to 
MCA Records, on Mattei's federal and state law claims for trademark infringement and 
tradetnark dilution. 131 The Court found that the song's title "Barbie Girl" was artistically 
relevant because the song was about Barbie and Ken, who was Barbie's significant other. 132 
Moreover, the song n1ade an actual reference to Barbie and Ken and symbolized other people 
like then1. 133 According to the court, the song did not explicitly tnislead consumers by 
suggesting Mattei endorsed it. 134 The only indication that associates Mattei with the song is the 
word "Barbie" in the title. 135 The court further noted that if the word "Barbie" were enough to 
satisfy the misleading prong of the artistic relevance test, the test would be useless. 136 Fron1 the 
reasoning in this case, one can see that the threshold for artistic relevance is n1inin1al. 
As more courts began to use the artistic relevance test tnany also began to modify the 
126 See Rosa Parks Settles Suit Over OutKast CD, CNN.COM (April 15, 2005) http:l/articles.cnn.com/2005-04-
15/entertainment/parks.settlement_l_rosa-parks-raymond-parks-institute-3 81-day-boycott? _ s=PM :SHOWBIZ. 
127 See Mattei, inc. V. MCA Records, Inc, .296 f.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2002). 
128 See id. at 899. 
129 See id. 
130 See id. 
131 See id. 
132 See Mattei, inc. Y. MCA Records, Inc, .296 f.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir. 2002). 
133 See id at 898 . ("Barbie was born in Gem1any in the 1950s as an adult collector's item. Over the years, Matte! 
transformed her from a doll that resembled a "German street walker," as she originally appeared, into a glamorous, 
long-legged blonde. Barbie has been labeled the ideal American woman and a bimbo.") . 
134 See id. at 902. 
135 See id. 
136 See id. 
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test. For exatnple, in No Fear, Inc. v. Imagine Films, Inc., the court used the first prong from 
Rogers v. Grimaldi's artistic relevance test and then determined the misleading prong by 
analyzing the likelihood of confusion test, and then weighed Plaintiffs showing of likelihood of 
fz . . t th . . l 137 COf1: uszon agmns e artzstzc re evance prong. 
In this case, the plaintiff used No Fear as its logo for sporting goods and jewelry and it 
was suing the defendant, Universal Studios, for producing a fihn called No Fear. 138 The filn1 No 
Fear was about a disturbed young male adult who seduces a younger girl and terrorizes her 
family. 139 The young tnan in the movie engages in multiple n1urders, and animal mutilation. 140 
The District Court first decided that the movie title was artistically relevant to the contents of the 
filn1; and yet, the court denied summary judgment because it did not find a showing of likelihood 
of confusion between the movie and the registered mark. 141 
The court in No Fear, explained that Rogers v. Grimaldi's artistic relevance test was 
limited to cases involving the use of a celebrity's nan1e in a movie title142 As a result, courts 
have expanded the artistic relevance test to include numerous other areas of expressive 
conduct. 143 The court also states: 
There is no doubt substantial confusion in the case law about the precise role of 
the likelihood of confusion factors in the application of the rule articulated in 
144 Rogers. 
No Fear illustrates the apparent confusion federal courts have regarding the proper application of 
the artistic relevance test. The court in that case quite clearly conflated two separate tests to 
reach its desired result. 
137 See No Fear, Inc. v. Imagine Films, Inc., 930 Supp. 1381, 1383-1384 (C.D. Cal. 1995). 
138 See id. at 1381. 
139 See id. at 1382. 
140 See id. 
141 See id. at 1384. 
142 See No Fear, Inc. v. Imagine Films, Inc., 930 Supp. 1381, 1382 (C. D. Cal. 1995). 
143 See id. 
144 See id. 
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ii. Likelihood of confusion view 
The second test used by courts is the likelihood of confusion test. This is the test that is 
traditionally used to determine whether there is a likelihood of confusion. For example, in Elvis 
Presley Enterprises, Inc. v. Capece, the court stated that the appropriate test in trademark 
infringement cases was the traditional likelihood of confitsion test, which incorporates the 
traditional likelihood of confusion factors. 145 In that case, the Fifth Circuit reviewed the factors 
of the likelihood of confusion test and focused on advertising, parody, similarity of the disputed 
1narks, sitnilarity of products and services, actual confusion, and the defendant's intent and 
defenses. l46 Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. was the assignee and registrant of all trademarks 
belonging to the Elvis Presley estate, and it sued Bany Capece for operating a restaurant and 
tavern called "The Velvet Elvis."147 The restaurant was a gaudy venue containing a multitude of 
Elvis men1orabilia and a menu of Elvis's favorite dishes. 148 The defendant argued that the 
restaurant was simply a parody which did not infringe on the Elvis trademark, but the Fifth 
Circuit disagreed and stated that parody was only one of several factors in the likelihood of 
confusion test. 149 Ultimately, the court found that Capece infringed the Elvis 1nark because 
parody is only a factor to be the service mark was used in advertising that is likely to alter the 
psychological impact of the mark, and the restaurant business was a natural area of expansion. 150 
The problen1 with only applying the likelihood of confusion test in a First An1endment context is 
that it gives no weight to First Amendn1ent concen1s because it treats the nan1e of an artistic the 
. ld . 1 d 151 same way 1t wou treat a comn1erc1a pro uct. 
145 See Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 207(5Lh Cir. 1998). 
146 See id. at 191-207. 
147 See id. at 191-192. 
148 See id. 192. 
149 See id. 
150 See Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 198-203 (5th Cir. 1998). 
151 See Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 449 (6th Cir. 2003) . 
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iii. Alternative avenues view 
Of the available tests analyzing trademark infringement claims, the test least frequently 
etnployed by courts is the alternative avenues test, which is also the test that most favors 
traden1ark holders. Under this test, courts detennine trademark infringetnent by deciding 
whether an alternative equivalent title, mark, or work could be used. 152 For instance, in 
American Dairy Queen, v. New Line Productions, the court used the alten1ative avenues test and 
granted Dairy Queen a preliminary injunction. 153 
In this case, the plaintiff, Dairy Queen, sued New Line Productions because of a title it 
had chosen for 'its "mockutnentary," Dairy Queens. 154 This mockumentary155 poked fun at the 
beauty contests in the Midwest. 156 Plaintiff argued that defendant's use of the title Dairy Queens 
infringed on its well-established tradetnark and that the public would associate its trademark with 
the unwholesmne content of the film. 157 The court, however, referenced alten1ative titles such as 
Dairy Princesses, that New Line Productions could have used. Ultin1ately, the court granted 
Plaintiff the injunction and stated that defendant had various alternative avenues for the title of 
its filn1. 15 8 The problem with only applying the alternative avenues test is that it is based on the 
notion that a property owner may limit a person's self expression on their property. 159 When 
this notion is extended to artists it lin1its every use of a mark if there are alternatives for the 
artist's intended expression. 160 This test will always favor the tradetnark owner and give little 
152 Seeid. at450. 
153 See American Dairy Queen v. New Line Productions, 35 F.Supp.2d 727,735 (D. Minn . 1998) . 
154 See id. at 728 . 
155 A "mockumentary" is a satirical program in the form of a documentary . See id. 
156 See id. at 728 . 
157 See id. at 729 . 
158 See American Dairy Queen v. New Line Productions, 35 F .Supp.2d 727, 735 (D. Minn. 1998). 
159 See Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 449 (6th Cir. 2003) . 
160 See id. 
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credence to the artist and first amendment rights. 161 
c. The proposed test and its application to Dillinger v. EA 
i. The proposed test 
Considering the inconsistency among the courts and the different policies promoted by 
each test, both courts and litigants would be better served if one test decided trademark 
infringement cases containing First Amendment issues. This proposed test actually combines the 
three 1najor tests, which are the (1) the artistic relevance test; (2) the likelihood of confusion test; 
and (3) the alternative avenues test. 
Under the proposed test, the first prong would require courts to analyze the traditional 
likelihood of confusion factors. 162 If such a confusion existed, then the court could proceed to 
the second prong. To determine a likelihood of confusion the court would weigh the following 
factors: 
(1) the strength of the 1nark; (2) proximity of the goods; (3) si1nilarity of the 
1narks; ( 4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) marketing chmmels used; (6) type of 
goods and the degree of care likely to be excercised by the purchaser; (7) 
defendant's intent in selecting the mark; and (8) likelihood of expansion of the 
d 1. 163 pro uct 1nes. 
After detennining whether a likelihood of confusion exists, the court could then detetmine the 
degree of artistic relevance found in the disputed mark. Under the second prong of the proposed 
test, if a court does not find artistic relevance, it will find for the plaintiff because there is a 
trademark infringen1ent, similar to the modified artistic relevance test. 164 If, however, a court 
found artistic relevance did exist, then the court would weigh the artistic relevance against the 
alternative avenues test. 
161 See id. 
162 See AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F .2d 341, 348 (9th Cir. 1979). 
163 See id. 
164 See No Fear, Inc. v. Imagine Films, Inc., 930 Supp. 1381, 1382 (C.D. Cal. 1995). 
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To clarify, under the proposed test, if a court finds m1nor artistic relevance, and an 
alternative could work just as well, the court would find trademark infringement. However, if 
the artistic relevance is so high that the absence of the 1nark would greatly diminish the artistic 
work, then the court should decide favorably for the defendant. 
For example, compare Rogers and Dairy Queen: the artistic relevance to the title of the 
film was intricately woven into the plot of the film in Rogers, yet the title in Dairy Queens had 
no relation to the 1nark and was n1erely catchy because of Dairy Queens' goodwill. 165 Although 
n1any courts suggest or prefer the use of one test over another, not one has looked outside the 
box. Courts should take a deeper look into balancing the rights involved and the policies that 
each test individually promotes. 166 By applying all the tests in an analysis it would provide a fair 
approach and consider each policy underlying each established test. 
Figure 4: The Proposed Test 
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If the proposed were applied in Dillinger v. EA it would require the court to delve into a 
165 See Grimaldi, 875 F.2d at 994; see also Dairy Queen, 141 F.3d, at 191-207. 
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deeper analysis and a n1ore favorable outcome to Dillinger, LLC. Under the first factor of the 
likelihood of confusion prong, Dillinger, LLC would have the burden of showing the strength of 
its mark, Dillinger. 167 Arguably, the Dillinger trademark registration could have been baned 
because it was a surname, and because it belonged to a notorious crin1inal; but, the USPTO 
actually approved the n1ark. 168 The USPTO's stamp of approval and lack of objection to the 
registration gives credibility to the strength of the tnark. Also, Dillinger, LLC's evident 
diligence in pursuing litigation to prevent infringement would probably favor Dillinger, LLC in 
detem1ining the strength of the mark. 169 Further, a general search for John Dillinger's name 
shows that there are only forty-nine people in the United States with that natne, n1aking it a less 
than common mark. 170 Additionally, many people probably associate the name with the gangster 
and his crimes, which n1eans it has most likely acquired a secondary tneaning. Dillinger is a 
fairly strong mark. 
Under the second factor, one n1ust analyze the proxin1ity of the products. 171 Although, 
Dillinger LLC has not used its names on guns it does plan to do so in the future, which is evident 
from its cunent trademark. 172 EA is using Dillinger to name its video gan1e guns and J.D. is 
known for using guns, specifically Tomn1y Guns. 173 The relatedness would be strong. Under the 
third factor of the likelihood of confusion prong, one would determine whether the degree of 
167 See AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348 (91h Cir. 1979). 
168 See Trademark Electronic Search System System, USPTO.COM, 
http:/ /tess2. uspto .gov/bin/showfield?f=toc&state=400 1 %3Aa5age7 .1.1 &p _ search=searchss&p _L=SO&BackReferen 
ce=&p_plural=yes&p_s_PARA1=&p_tagrepl~%3A=PARAl%24LD&expr=PARAI+AND+PARA2&p_s_PARA2 
=dillinger&p_tagrepl-%3A=PARA2%24COMB&p_op_ALL=AND&a_default=search&a_search=Submit+Query& 
a search=Submit+Query( last visited Jan . 29, 2012) (search for registrations of Dillinger). 
169 See id. 
170 See WHITEPAGES.COM, http://names.whitepages.com/john/dillinger (last visited Jan. 29, 2012) (search engine). 
171 See Dillinger, 2011 U.S . Dist. LEXIS 64006, at *7-8. 
172 See LALONDE, supra note 4 . 
173 See LALONDE, supra note 4. 
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similarity between the two marks is high. 174 EA is using Dillinger on its video game guns, the 
surname of the mark. 
Under the fourth factor of the first prong, one must analyze whether there was actual 
confusion; however, Dillinger, LLC failed to show this. 175 Dillinger, LLC made efforts to show 
that there was confusion when media uses a mark, but the court did not find it sufficient to show 
actual confusion. Under the fifth factor of the first prong, one must look at the n1arketing 
channels for both. Unfortunately, this can be shown through surveys, which can be fairly 
expensive, however, current marketing strategies used in the gan1ing arena could strongly imply 
a gamer would believe that a mark in a video game is endorsed by the owner. 176 Video games 
have become an itnportant 1nediun1 for product placement. 177 Under the sixth factor, one must 
look at the purchaser's degree of care. The mark Dillinger n1ay suggest to a gamer who likes 
gangster tnob-related material that the mark is endorsed by affiliates of J.D., especially because 
of current marketing practices in the gaming industry. 178 Seventh, EA stated that it could not 
remember its reason for choosing Dillinger, but the Defendant's continued to use the mark after 
being warned by Dillinger, LLC. 179 This could have assisted in showing defendant's possible 
bad faith in the use of the mark, specifically its use in Godfather II. 
The last factor under the likelihood of confusion prong requtres that plaintiff show 
expansion of its market and Dillinger, LLC could have shown its expansion to gun products 
174 See supra, p. 20. 
175 See Dillinger, LLC. v Electronic Arts, Inc., No. 1 :09-cv-1236-JMS-DKL, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEX1S 64006, at* 19 
(S.D. Ind. June 16, 2011). 
176 See Product Placement on the Rise in Video Games: Marketers desperate to engage vvell-to-do market of 132 
million gamers,MSNB .COM, (July 21, 2006) http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/13960083/ns/technology _and _science-
tech_and_gadgets/t/product-placement-rise-video-games/#.TyiG4sUeN2A. 
177 See id. 
178 See id. 
179 See Dillinger, 2011 U .S. Dist. LEXIS 64006, at *7-8. 
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because it had a trademark registration with the USPT0. 180 The court in, Dillinger, LLC v. EA, 
stated that use of a well-known gun manufacturer such as Smith & Wesson would be an 
infringement. 181 Ulti1nately, the factors of the likelihood of confusion test were strongly in 
Plaintiffs favor. 
Under the artistic relevance prong, the court found Dillinger was slightly relevant to the 
game because he was a criminal affiliated with that particular gun and the video game related to 
mobsters. But, as discussed in the case, J.D. and the Godfather are based in two different time 
eras and are different types of criminals. There is some artistic relevance but it is not nearly as 
strong as the artistic relevance presented in Rogers. 
Lastly, under the alternative avenues prong the court would have found that there were 
equivalent substitutes to name the guns in the Godfather video game series. Although, the court 
would have found that Dillinger was slightly relevant to the Godfather video gan1e series it 
would not be sufficient to establish a necessary need by EA. The use of another nan1e, for 
example, "Tomn1y Gun" would not diminish the value of the artistry of the game. The name 
would be the nan1e of the actual gun, instead of the name of the gangster who was famous for 
using the gun. The end result would have established a better analysis to detern1ine the rights of 
Dillinger, LLC and EA. Under this proposed test Dillinger, LLC most likely would have 
prevailed. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The First A1nendn1ent was designed to enable criticism of the govemn1ent and other 
180 See LALONDE, supra note 3. 
181 See Dillinger, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64006, at *7-8 . 
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entities without retaliation, which is why the fair use defense exists. t82 On the other hand, the 
inadequate safeguarding of traden1arks can lead to grave econmnic dmnages for trademark 
holders. 183 Federal courts should be consistent in their decisions of protecting the right to fair use 
and the protections granted by trademarks. Greater consistency among the Federal Courts in 
applying a test that serves both the First Amendment's purpose, and enhances traden1ark 
protections, is far past due. For this reason, courts should apply the proposed test, which 
incorporates the most useful aspects of the three tests in this legal area. 184 By removing 
probletnatic areas that are frequently n1isinterpreted and misapplied, the proposed test actualy 
furthers the in1portant interests of artists and trademark users. 
Dillinger v. EA, is a great example of how the proposed test could have allowed the 
litigants and the court to better understand that there was more at risk in that case then sin1ply 
allowing a gan1ing company to make a profit frmn an item using a registered trademark. 185 
Indeed, crucial First An1end1nent protections were at stake. 
Unfortunately, one of the problems facing surrounding the utilization of a proper test to 
analyze traden1ark infringement cases is that this problem may retnain unaddressed until circuit 
courts wrestle with the tretnendous confusion found in the District Courts.t 86 A perfect example 
is Parks v. LaFace Records, 187 or any other case where parties fail to advocate for a different test 
during litigation. 
While the Lanham Act and established case law should resolve traden1ark infringement 
litigation a majority of the courts have decided that when a trademark issue faces a First 
182 See Mike McCurry and Marek McKinnon, Free Speech Shouldn't be a Shield for Online Thieves, 
FIERCETELECOM.COM (Sept. 19, 2011, 6:09AM), http://www.fiercetelecom .com/story/free-speech-shouldnt-be-
shield-online-thieves/20 ll-09-19#ixzzl Z3Kn21BR 
183 See id. 
184 See supra, pp . 20. 
185 See supra, pp . 17. 
186 See supra, note 15. 
187 See supra, note 126. 
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Amendment issue, the First Amendn1ent issue always govetns. 188 This unfortunate pattern 
followed by courts permits companies like EA to ditninish traden1ark rights because courts fail to 
recognize that EA is a business making a profit 189 off of video games, and using the First 
An1endtnent as a mere excuse to blatantly infringe a registered trademark. 190 Any supposed 
artist work that uses a trademark should be treated like any other media that uses products, 
sponsorships, or endorsements; it should be treated like a comn1ercial use excluding instances of 
. . d d 191 nominative use an paro y. The deterrence that the Lanham Act is supposed to promote 
against infringement is lost in cases like Dillinger; indeed, because of the current confusion, 
businesses like EA, who are constantly in litigation over these matters, generally win. 
If courts continue to blindly apply the Rogers test the leeway for abuse by companies like 
EA is limitless. The proposed test, by contrast, would ultitnately balance the equities for each 
party. Unless courts find a better way to balance these rights trademark rights will greatly 
ditninish because of the minitnal artistic require1nent required by Rogers v. Grimaldi. The 
proposed test would provide better protection because it incorporates the Lanham Act's overall 
purpose, by applying the likelihood of confusion test, it protects property rights by applying the 
alternative avenues test, and it strengthens First Amendn1ent rights by applying the artistically 
relevant test. 
188 See supra, note 11. 
189 See supra, note 176. ("Spending on in-game advertising and product placement, $56 million last year, will reach 
$730 million by 2010, predicts Yankee Group, a Boston research firm."). 
190 See supra, note 4 . After acknowledging the issues raised in the Godfather EA still continued to use the mark in 
Godfather II. 
19 1 See supra note 176. 
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